The development of operational surge prediction in southern Lake Michigan is reviewed through the 10-year span starting with the disastrous surge of June 26, 1954 which took several lives in the Chicago area. Particular emphasis is given to the application of the work of others, especially Platzman,. to the surge-prediction problem. Considerable detail is given on the surge of August 3, 1960, for which a successful prediction was made. This example, with its messages to the public, could serve as a model for future surge predictions. Finally a set of steps is given by which a prediction is made, followed by comments on those items still needing research before we can evaluate all parameters for an operational surge prediction.
I. INTRODUCTION
The first operational Great Lakes surge (seiche)3 forecast was made on July 6, 1954 by Gordon E. Dunn, then Meteorologist-in-Charge at the Chicago office of the U.S. Weather Bureau. Since the Chicago office's forecast and warning responsibility for the United States portion of the Great Lakes had begun many years prior to 1954, that office, and Dunn in particular, had experience in observing these surges.
Public attention was drawn to this type of phenomenon by the disastrous surge 10 days earlier . (June 26) , in which seven people were drowned while fishing from a breakwater at the entrance to Montrose Harbor (Chicago) . The cause of these surges was not known a t the time but in his report to the Chief of the Weather Bureau on the June surge Dunn said ' I . . . every seiche which has been brought to my attention during my 15 years in Chicago has occurred in connection with a squall line, a pressure jump, and in the early morning or forenoon."
I n August 1954, in a letter to Maurice Ewing of Columbia University, Dunn gave the basis for his seiche forecast of July 6 by saying: "Noticing the extraordinary pressure jump and the similarity of the conditions with the June 26th squall-line, I issued a seiche warning and the Coast Guard cleared all beaches and piers in the Chicago area and there was no loss of life. Since I do not understand the physical processes involved, the excellent verification is considered entirely fortuitous." This letter was in response to a request for information about the June 26 surge. Ewing and collaborators were interested in this case and an exchange of letters occurred between them and Dunn in August 1954. Soon thereafter Ewing, Press, and Donn [2] published their theory; they said ". . . one can explain the Lake Michigan wave on the basis of resonant transfer of energy from the traveling pressure jump and its associated high winds in the air to a gravity wave traveling with equal velocity in the lake. Only for equal velocities can a large wave be generated." They t.hen showed that the atmospheric and water waves were moving with equal speeds-about 65 m.p.h.-in the June 26 case. They also said that if their thesis was correct, several hours advance warning might be possible in the future.
Harris [3] published a more detailed study of the June 26, 1954 surge, and in his conclusions mentioned the following important point: "In determining which pressure jump lines will be accompanied by important water level disturbances in Chicago, it is likely that the orientation of the pressure jump w i l l be equally or more important than the speed of the disturbance. This is because shoaling, reflection, and convergence due to the contours of the shore must all be considered to account for a disturbance of the observed magnitude."
As a result of the work of About that time the squall-line thunderstorms were approaching the Chicago area and a public warning of locally damaging winds was currently in effect. In order to prevent confusion of warnings, the surge warning was not issued until the damaging wind storm had passed, because it was realized that this delay still permitted adequate time to take such precautions as could be taken for the surge. Instead, a warning was sent to the Weather Bureau station providing local service to the eastern shore of Lake Michigan, as the surge would hit there fmt before being reflected toward Chicago.
At The predicted time of the peak surge was 1225 CDT, based on Platzman's paper, and the small time range given in the warnings was considered adequate because of (1) the closeness of the situation to that of June 26, 1954, (2) the success of the timing in Platzman's study, and (3) the knowledge that the factors influencing the speed of the water wave were much more certain than the usual variables in meteorology. Too much leeway in the timing probably would have caused the police much difficulty in restraining the people from returning to their bathing and fishing before the surge hit. On the other hand, more uncertainty was intended in the forecast of magnitude of the surge, since this was dependent on many uncertain meteorological variables.
The public was kept informed by the Weather Bureau a t Chicago through the following additional messages: These releases along with others dealing with the wind storm pro+ded the main material for the many excellent 'newspaper 'stories that appeared that evening. Never-.theless, a full-page press release was made the following morning briefly stating what was done, what a seiche .was, how it was caused, and the scientific references which provided'the basis for the, prediction. I n spite of the amount and promptness of information released, there were numerous requests, especially from the press services, for f&ther information. 
IMPROVEMENTS IN TECHNIQUE AFTER THE

'
The accuracy of the August 3, 1960 surge forecast, 'although 'perhaps not so fort.itous as that of Dunn in July 1954, nevertheless was still felt to be dependent upon the close. similarity between the August 1960 and June 1954 cask. The full'effects of the meteorological vafiables of speed' and direction of the squall line and tKe strength of its pressure jump and squall winds were unlpown when the forecast was made.
Discussions with Platzman after the 1960 surge brought answers. to many questions.
. Work in progress in Elateman's group !at the time of -the 1960 surge yielded graphs relating surge amplitude to the direction and speed of the squall line (for a unit pressure'jump), and a similar set relating the time of arrival of the strongest surge to the velocity of the squall line. H e also prepared a graph for computing operationally the speed and direction of movement of the squall line from pressure-jump times a t several stations. Most of this information is given in Par,t I [7] appearing elsewhere in this issue of the Review.
Use of these charts .required the determination of an empirical4 shoaling factor to convert the offshore surge heights ' of the graphs' to heights at the shore. This determination was made on the' basis of the surge a t Montrose Harbor in the June 1954 case, and gave a factor of 7.5. All this information was assembled in a check sheet for forecasters. The kaphs for the "wind only" effect as given by Platzman [7] in Part I were not available when the check sheet was' made'.. This effect is incorporated implicitly ,in the empirical shoaling factor and therefore corresponds :to the 50-to 60:kt. gusts of the June 1954 case. This was the extent of the understanding in early May 1962. May 1962 was unusual in that two prominent but not damaging surges occurred within a few hours of each other, and another lesser surge occurred two days later. The first two"occurred on May 10 a t about 0730 and 1000 CDT on the' Chicago shore. ,The second of these surges was the larger, but it did not attain the height of the 1960 surge. No warning was issued for either'of these surges because the squall line did not extend as far across the Lake as in the 1954 and 1960 surges and the wind gusts were insignificant, so the surge amplitudes were expected to be minor. I n retrospect, the magnitude of these surges (especially the second one) was large enough that warnings would have been desirable. The second surge was particularly interesting in that the fall of water was considerably greater' than the rise, causing boats in a t least one harbor area to rest on the bottom before the water level returned to normal:
The third surge occurred around noon on May 12, and a warning was issued. Operationally this surge appeared to have great threat.
While the, pressure-jump line had a speed of only about 40 kt., it was moving toward the southeast, the pressure jump in the Chicago area exceeded that of the June 1954 surge, and the wind gusts were strong, reaching 64 kt. at O'Hare Airport in Chicago. The warning mentioned that the surge might be as high as the severe 1954 surge, but the surge height turned out to be more like the weaker surge of two days earlier. Again the drop in water level well exceeded the rise. The forecaster was aware that only a small pressure jump had occurred at Milwaukee and thus that the squall line'probably was shorter than in the 1954 and 1960 surges; but Chicago did not as yet have its WSR-57 radar to use in determining lime length and other radars were either out of operation or did not reach far enough to permit line-length determination. Because of the uncertainties in length of the squall line and in the effect of line length, the forecaster had to provide for the greatest threat compatible with the information available.
From the surges so far reported here, especially these last three, we additionally know, or a t least have great suspicion, that the length of the squall line is a major factor in the magnitude of the surge on the Chicago shore but that line length does not affect the timing of the surge. This last is believed because the timing was good on the May 12 surge. If the squall line reaches north of Milwaukee so that it will pass over the whole Southern Basin of the Lake, the empirical shoaling factor of 7.5 given earlier is appropriate. For squall lines shorter than this, the shoaling factor probably is smaller, but a quantitative relation is not yet known. With the WSR-57 radar now well established a t Chicago, the development of an empirical correlation of length of the line with magnitude of the surge is possible.
An indication that the pressure effect on the water wave may be more important than the wind effect can be found in these May surges, because in the surges of May 10 the wind gusts were insignificant and the surge was rather high, whereas on May 12 the gusts were quite high but the surge was not. A reason why the pressure effect may be more important, in spite of Platzman's [7] results showing them to be about the same, is that his assumption for the profile of the pressure is likely to be considerably better than his assumption for the wind profile.
From these May surges, it also appears that when the squall line is shorter than the width of the Southern Basin of the Lake, the negative surge, or drop in water levels, is greater in absolute value than the positive surge. There is a clear need to rerun Platzman's calculations using varying lengths of squall lines to determine the dependence of surge conditions upon this parameter. The curvature of the line could also be of significance (Platzman [GI used a straight line whereas most squall lines are curved). Irish [4] attributed some of the errors in the computation of the August 1960 surge to the curvature of the real squall line.
OTHER SURGES
the early morning or forenoon has generally been borne out by events since that 1954 statement.
Just why surges usually occur before or shortly after noon has not been studied. It is probably because .the strong northwesterly flow aloft needed to prod'uce a fsstmoving squall line also favors the production of strong nocturnal thunderstorm and squall-line activity' in the northern Great Plains-an area with a nocturnal maximum of such activity. The squall-line speed needed td produce significant surges is such that the lines would generally arrive over southern Lake Michigan' before noon from their northern Great Plains nocturnal source region. There is no known contradiction of this hypothesis in the surge cases discussed here, as all squall lines involved formed in or on the edge of the northern Great Plains after midnight and before 0600 CST, and all moved for great distances before decaying. In the June 26, 1954, surge, the squall line was identifiable all the way to the east coast and even then did not lose identity.
Ewing, Press, and Donn and ~~i~. rn this the surge moved rapidly over the travels with the squall line as it crosses the Lake and thus, deep water of Lake Huron and slowly over the much for the Usual west to east motion, occurs on the eastern shallower water of Lake Erie, and thus resonant coupling shore with the squall line, but must be reflected to reach of atmospheric and water disturbances was possible in the western shore. This means that the west-shore surge both Lakes. Donn gave 30 m.p.h. as the resonant speed can and usually will occur a t a time of meteorological for Lake Erie in the Cleveland area. surges of the type quiet and thereby can catch people unaware unless they considered here should O C C m anywhere in the world where are alerted to the danger. that of the 700-mb. flow, which provides a fast and early &st approximation to whether a surge threat will exist.) 1. Obtain the speed of the squall line, and the direction toward which it is moving. The line is assumed to move perpendicular to itself. Radar should be excellent for this purpose.
2. Obtain the magnitude of the pressure jump on the upstream (usually western) side of the Lake. This has been taken as the average of the jumps at. Milwaukee, O'Hare Airport, Midway Airport, and the Weather Bureau Forecast Center in Chicago.
3. Determine the time of the pressure jump a t O'Hare Airport.
4. Using the graphs given by Platzman [7] as figure 5 in Part I and the information in 1 and 3 above, compute the time of arrival of the surge a t the desired point. The surge on the eastern shore will occur approximately with the passage of the squall line. Note that the time of arrival of both the incident and reflected surge is nearly independent of the squall line speed. This is probably because the water wave, once forme,d, moves at a speed independent of the atmospheric wave.
.
For squall lines reaching across the full Southern Basin of the Lake, multiply Platzman's offshore amplitudes given in his figure 4 ("pressure only") by the number of hundredths of inches of the average pressure jump and then by 7.5 to obtain the height of the maximum surge in feet a t the shore.
As an example, take a squall line moving toward 135' a t 50 kt. with an average pressure jump of 0.09 in. From figure 5 in [7] we see that the reflected surge a t Montrose Harbor should arrive about 135 min. after the pressure jump a t O'Hare Airport.
The magnitude of the maximum surge occurring at that time a t Montrose Harbor would be 0.080X9X7.5=5.4 ft., where 0.080 ft. is the offshore height of the wave from figure 4 for a pressure jump of 0.01 in., and 9 is the number of hundredths of inches of the pressure jump. Similar computations can be made for the other seven stations. Note that the "wind only" graphs have not been used. Whether the wind and pressure effects are really additive, and if so what the respective shoaling factors are, is still for the future to determine.
Although this has not yet been tried, it may be appropriate to make some adjustment for wind by lowering the estimated surge heights slightly when the wind gusts are unusually low ( I 40 kt.), and raising them when the gusts are unusually high ( 2 70 kt.). Otherwise ranges of plus and minus about half an hour in arrival time and 1 ft. in amplitude from the values computed above are probably sufficient to use in the warning, provided the squall line extends across the full Southern Basin of the Lake. puted arrival time is still probably adequate, but the amplitude is likely to be less than that computed, by an amount which a t present is probably best taken as the percentage of the Southern Basin not covered by the line. The range of expected surge should perhaps be larger in such cases.
The warning for Chicago normally should be withheld until the squall-line weather has passed Chicago, to avoid confusion in warnings, and it should be sent first to stations on the southern and eastern shores where the surge will occur with the squall-line passage.
The surge does not occur with the rapidity or power of a breaking water wave created by the wind. Instead, the rise of water is gradual over several minutes, although some wave action similar to that of waves created by the wind may occur as the peak is approached. The threat to life is thus mainly to non-swimmers-such as fishermen on a pier or breakwater, or children wading or playing at the water's edge-in general to persons who may be unaware of the gradually rising water until too late to retreat to safety.
With these aids I am confident that this type of surge is one of the fairly rare events that can be forecast with high certainty and accuracy.
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